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Abstract 
We investigate whether acquisition experience of executive and non-executive directors 
is priced in their remuneration. We find that acquisition experience generates a 
contractual premium, and the relative size of this premium is higher for non-executive 
directors than for executives. Only a director’s track record related to past successful 
acquisitions is priced. Acquisition experience at the individual director is not 
remunerated if this type of experience is already abundantly present in the firm through 
the firm’s past acquisition record or via the experience of the other board members. We 
verify the results by examining potential endogeneity concerns, by analyzing a broad set 
of different views on acquisition experience (such as industry-specific, broad or 
international experience, experience on a target’s board), and by ruling out alternative 
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The experience that executive and non-executive directors accumulate by working in specific 
positions within firms and possibly across industries is one of the most important dimensions 
of their human capital (Mackey et al., 2014; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2010). As such, firm and 
industry experience remains an important predictor of pay (Custódio et al., 2013; Datta and 
Iskandar-Datta, 2014). Specifically, studies show that non-executive directors effort, 
experience, and resourcefulness contribute significantly to their remuneration (Bugeja et al., 
2016; Fedaseyeu et al., 2018). Also, general managerial human capital that is transferable 
across firms and industries leads to a higher pay premium for CEOs, more so than specialized 
skills (Custódio et al., 2013). This finding is stronger when CEOs with general managerial 
skills are hired from outside the firm rather than when they are internally promoted (Brockman 
et al., 2016). Overall, these studies suggest that variance in pay is primarily driven by 
differences in human capital that individuals accumulate over their career path.  
However, there is a paucity in the literature on if and why directors are paid differently 
across and within firms for a specific type of human capital. We address this question by 
focusing on a task-specific experience, namely that of M&A experience, and investigate 
whether this experience is priced in the remuneration contract of directors. Throughout the 
paper, we use ‘directors to refer to both executive and non-executive directors1. This task-
specific human capital deserves attention for the following reasons. First, takeovers are 
complex operations that require expertise to identify an appropriate target, undertake the 
required due diligence, assess the potential synergistic value contribution of the target, decide 
on the level of integration, pursue a negotiation process, and, upon a successful conclusion, 
raise the acquisition financing and implement the complete or partial integration of the target 
into the acquirer (Hambrick et al., 2015; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Although acquisitions 
are undertaken with the support of investment banks, takeover lawyers, and due diligence and 
audit firms, directors remain responsible for overseeing the takeover process, for advice to 
                                               
1 We chose this definition because our empirical context is the UK. According to the UK corporate 
governance code executive director is a top manager (officer) who is a member of the board of directors. A non-
executive director (often referred to as “director” in the US) is a board member who does not hold an executive 
position within the firm. 
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shareholders, and for the ultimate decision. Second, takeovers are a ubiquitous and salient 
strategic activity as hardly any firm is not exposed to a takeover bid or making such bids itself. 
More than ninety percent of US-listed firms engaged in acquisitions between 1990-2000 with 
a median of eight acquisitions (Netter et al., 2011). About 75% of firms can even be called 
serial acquirers, taking over several firms on a yearly basis (Renneboog and Vansteenkiste, 
2019). The size of global M&A deals has exceeded USD 4.1 trillion in 2018 (JP Morgan, 
2019). Third, acquisitions typically require large investments that profoundly affect a 
company's growth, value creation, and long-term prospects (Renneboog and Vansteenkiste, 
2019). Fourth, despite their capital intensive nature, unsuccessful acquisitions are far from 
rare (Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006; King et al., 2004); the combined cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs) of bidder and target are negative in almost half of the acquisitions (Martynova 
and Renneboog, 2008). M&A failure is often attributed, among other things, to lack of 
experience with the takeover process at the managerial, director, or firm level (Aktas et al., 
2009; Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006; Kim and Alvarez, 2019; Maas et al., 2019; 
McDonald et al., 2008; Zollo and Singh, 2004). Fifth, director human capital and, in particular, 
relevant acquisition experience is generally scarce (Castanias and Helfat, 1991; Khanna et al., 
2014).  
Therefore, we examine whether directors receive a pay premium for this important 
type of human capital, their acquisition experience, and identify the conditions under which 
acquisition experiences are compensated differently across and within firms. We use a rich 
dataset that covers all constituents of the FTSE All-Share Index, 2,243 unique firms, over a 
period of 17 years (1999-2016), merged with M&A and ownership data from Thomson-
Reuters, board of director data from BoardEx, and financial data from Datastream. First, our 
results reveal that directors receive a pay premium for their acquisition experience. Second 
that the relative size of this premium is higher for non-executive directors than for executives. 
Third, that the compensation is higher when the director was involved in successful 
acquisitions. Fourth, a director’s acquisitions experience is more valuable (and priced) in firms 
with limited acquisition experience relative to firms with an abundance of acquisition 
experience. In the above empirical tests, the dependent variable is total compensation. When 
we disaggregate the effect of acquisition experience to the different components of 
compensation, we find that experience is predominantly priced in the base salary (and not in 
the bonus or equity-based components of pay).  
Our study contributes to the literature on remuneration and human capital in the 
following ways. First, the human capital literature focuses primarily on general managerial 
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experience, measured by the number of years and of positions that directors have held within 
or across firms and industries without considering actual tasks they had performed (Brockman 
et al., 2016; Carpenter et al., 2001; Fedaseyeu et al., 2018). By examining whether task-
specific human capital is contractually priced and providing evidence corroborating this claim, 
we bring new insights into how experience is captured at the granular level. The key strength 
of this granular conceptualization is its measurement validity. Second, the finding that the 
relative size of a takeover experience varies between non-executive and executive directors 
suggests that firms not only consider task-specific human capital in determining remuneration, 
but also weigh the expected effectiveness of this experience in a corporate context by the role 
a director plays in the firm. Third, the higher pay for acquisition experience based on past 
successful takeovers suggests that firms pay premiums conditional on directors’ ability to 
accomplish a takeover task well and that past successes in handling takeovers signal future 
success. While learning from failed acquisitions is not excluded, firms appear to shy away 
from paying a premium for learning from failures. Fourth, the pay related to takeover 
experience depends on the acquisition experience already available in the firm. Firms without 
much collective acquisition experience recognize the importance of acquisition experience of 
directors by offering a higher remuneration. The above contingent factors shed new light on 
why firms might offer different pay premiums for directors with similar task-specific human 
capital.  
This study also contributes to the acquisition literature. Several studies examined 
acquisition experience either at the firm (e.g., Aktas et al., 2009), non-executive or executive 
director level (Field and Mkrtchyan, 2017; Harford and Schonlau, 2013; Mira et al., 2018). 
We extend this literature by providing some nuances in the interplay between acquisition 
experience at the individual and firm’s level as well as the value of this experience for 
executive and non-executive directors in determining their remuneration.  
 
2. Institutional Background, Theory, and Hypotheses 
2.1 Institutional Background 
Remuneration disclosure of executive and non-executive directors is an important aspect of 
the UK corporate regulation. The law requires UK listed companies to prepare Directors
Remuneration Report as a separate section within the annual financial report (UK Companies 
Act, 2006, s. 422). It also gives extensive guidance on the composition of the executive 
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director compensation such that it should be "designed to promote the long-term success of 
the company" (UK Corporate Governance Code – henceforth CGC - 2018, D.1), performance-
related elements are supposed to be "transparent, stretching and rigorously applied" (UK 
CGC, 2018), D.1), and a formal and transparent remuneration policy is to be put in place (UK 
CGC, 2018, D.2). 
For non-executive directors, the CGC states that their remuneration should reflect 'time 
commitment and responsibilities of the role' and should not consist of share options (UK CGC, 
2016, D.1.3). More importantly, the code explicitly states that non-executive compensation 
can be determined by the board or the articles of association and offers discretion to companies 
to comply with this guideline or explain deviations (UK CGC, 2018). Consistent with these 
requirements, non-executive directors are not paid the same fee across the board, their pay 
varies with individual traits, predominantly age, tenure, and network size (Goh and Gupta, 
2016), gender, and director independence (Geiler and Renneboog, 2016; Goh and Gupta, 
2016). 
In sum, the prescriptions of the CGC on non-executive director pay suggest that it is 
not only determined by the amount of time they spent on the board and the responsibilities 
they assume (e.g. committee memberships), but also by the experience they bring to the board. 
This is also in line with the international corporate governance guideline which explicitly 
states that non-executive directors pay should reflect the director’s contribution to the firm 
from experience, quality of input, and leadership (ICGN, 2010, 2.1).  
With this in mind, we examine the pay premium that directors, both executive and 
non-executive, receive for their acquisition experiences and the contingent factors that 
ameliorate or weaken this relationship. 
 
2.2 Theory and Hypotheses 
2.2.1 Directors’ Acquisition Experience and Remuneration 
Human capital refers to the set of skills, knowledge, and experience that individuals 
accumulate through formal education, on-the-job training, and work experience (Becker, 
1995; Coff and Kryscynski, 2011). The development of these skills and expertise requires 
investments of time, money and effort, in anticipation of a return in the form of higher pay 
and improved individual- and hence corporate performance.  
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In the corporate governance literature, human capital is primarily proxied by 
experience (e.g., Brockman et al., 2016; Carpenter et al., 2001; Fedaseyeu et al., 2018), with 
a few exceptions where it is measured by formal training (e.g. Datta and Iskandar-Datta, 
2014). Experience is one type of human capital, developed by repeatedly performing a specific 
(coded) process and receiving performance feedback (Kolb and Kolb, 2005), and can be either 
task-specific or not. The former type is measured by the number of times directors perform a 
particular task, while the latter type is measured by the number of years a position (or 
positions) is (are) held by a director. In line with the definition of experience-based human 
capital, we conceptualize acquisition experience as being repeatedly engaged in takeovers, a 
task-specific experience. Repetition enables one to discern certain patterns in the action 
consequence loop and helps to develop a mental scheme that can be retrieved when similar 
environmental cues are faced (Ericsson and Lehmann, 1996; Hayward, 2002; Yeo and 
Marquardt, 2015). In the case of complex operations (such as takeovers), the number of 
repetitions necessary to identify patterns and draw valid inferences may be higher than for 
simpler tasks in which patterns are easily discernable (Hayward, 2002). Acquisitions are 
among the most publicly visible strategic actions; they require complex and far-reaching 
decisions that demand the attention and contribution of the entire board of directors (McNulty 
and Pettigrew, 1999).  
Several studies point out the relevance of acquisition experience on acquisition 
performance in which they measure acquisition experience at the level of the firm (e.g., Aktas 
et al., 2011; Zollo and Singh, 2004), the board (Hayward, 2002; McDonald et al., 2008; 
Nadolska and Barkema, 2014) and the individual director (e.g. the CEO) (Field and 
Mkrtchyan, 2017).  These studies indicate the positive effect of acquisition experience, at 
different levels of analysis, on the performance of acquisitions. They imply that with repeated 
acquisitions firms learn (develop certain routines) and directors gain expertise to handle 
acquisitions successfully.   
 This is also reflected in the labor market where acquisition experience can increase 
the subsequent board seats offered to CEOs (Harford and Schonlau, 2013) and non-executive 
directors (Mira et al., 2018). The implication is that acquisition experience is valuable human 
capital as it may improve future acquisition performance and such that companies recruit 
directors with acquisition experience to leverage on their expertise. Therefore, we argue that 
the value of this experience should not only be observed in the demand for new board positions 
as documented by the above studies but also in the remuneration a firm offers to directors with 
acquisition experience. So, we expect:   
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H1: The acquisition experience of executive directors and non-executive directors is 
priced in their remuneration contract.  
 
2.2.2. Remuneration Returns of Director Acquisition Experience: Contingent Factors   
After establishing the baseline relation between acquisition experience and remuneration, we 
argue that the above contractual relation may depend on three important factors, related to (i) 
a director’s position, i.e, whether a director assumes an executive or non-executive role in the 
firm, (ii) whether his or her past acquisition experience was with successful or unsuccessful 
takeovers, which may signal his or her ability to undertake future successful acquisitions and, 
(iii) whether acquisition experience is scarcely or relatively abundantly present in the firm. 
We develop hypotheses on these three contingencies in the subsequent section. 
Director type   
The roles that executive and non-executive directors typically play in a company are 
complementary (Hambrick et al., 2015). While CEOs and other executive board members are 
responsible for managing the company on a day-to-day basis, non-executive directors are 
expected to provide them with advice on strategic issues and monitor their work on behalf of 
the shareholders (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Mira et al., 2018). The presumption that 
executives who are not monitored engage in suboptimal decision-making, warrants the 
presence of non-executive directors on the board and their engagement in strategic decisions 
of higher importance as mergers and accusations (Fama, 1980). For non-executive directors 
to properly carry out their advisory and supervisory roles, they need to have the necessary 
knowledge and matching incentives (Zattoni and Cuomo, 2010).  
Agency theory presumes that executive directors' appetite for acquisitions may not be 
completely aligned with the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). This is partly because acquisitions have two possible consequences for 
executive remuneration: a compensation increase due to acquisition performance or due to an 
increase in firm size following the acquisition. Girma et al. (2006) confirms the effect of these 
two effects on executive remuneration. First, an increase in firm size accounts for more than 
45 percent of the variance in remuneration, whereas firm overall performance merely explains 
5 percent (Tosi et al., 2000). This implies that executive directors may be willing to undertake 
value-reducing acquisitions given the positive net effect of corporate size on their 
compensation (Harford and Li, 2007; Wright et al., 2002). Second, executive remuneration 
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can go up (at least temporarily) due to a performance bonus paid out for acquiring another 
firm (regardless of its success) (Guest, 2009). In other words, acquisitions motivated by 
empire-building tendencies may still occur even when executive directors are experienced. In 
contrast, non-executive directors with relevant acquisition experience are bound to more 
easily spot deals that are motivated by executive directors' own interests and they may, 
therefore, constrain these executives takeover transactions by requesting important target 
details, or information on the overall deal value (Armstrong et al., 2014; McNulty and 
Pettigrew, 1999). This is consistent with the study by Johnson, Hoskisson, and Hitt (1993), 
which shows that non-executive board members are more involved in strategic decisions when 
executives need expertise to craft strategies due to limited experience or a lack of incentives.  
 In sum, what the above arguments suggest is that the important role assigned to non-
executive directors to curb value-destroying acquisitions and hence to oppose executive 
directors possibly ill-considered pro-takeover stance pleads for rewarding non-executive’s 
corporate acquisition experience. Consequently, the acquisition experience of non-executive 
directors is likely to be valued proportionally more by firms and thus remunerated accordingly. 
Consequently, we hypothesize: 
H2: Acquisition experience is priced relatively more in non-executive director 
remuneration contracts than in executive director remuneration contracts  
Quality of acquisition experience   
Firms remunerate directors with acquisition experience under the premise that this 
expertise will be used to manage future acquisitions successfully (Harford and Schonlau, 
2013; Mira et al., 2018). Experiential learning theory suggests that directors learn from 
undertaking acquisitions through repetition, getting feedback, and identifying patterns that can 
be replicated in similar settings (Hayward, 2002; Kolb and Kolb, 2005; Zollo and Singh, 
2004). This may entail that, ceteris paribus, as the number of acquisitions in which directors 
engage increases, they are able to leverage on their expertise to successfully make future 
acquisitions (Greve, 2003; Kolb and Kolb, 2005). While being involved in acquisitions 
presents opportunities to learn, only those acquisitions followed by a better acquisition 
performance may count in the learning process. Successful acquisitions (that yield positive 
announcement returns) may hinge on directors expertise on how to reapply past successful 
takeover processes (Nadolska and Barkema, 2014). Indeed, Field and Mkrtchyan (2017) show 
that directors past successful acquisition experience positively has a strong impact on future 
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performance. Hence, a track record of past acquisition success may justify higher 
remuneration as it increases the likelihood of undertaking successful future acquisitions and 
reduce significantly failing ones. Consequently, companies may prefer directors with such 
expertise and hence be willing to remunerate them better.  
H3: Past acquisition experience is priced in directors’ remuneration contracts provided 
that the experience is based on successful acquisitions.   
Firms’ Acquisition Experience 
Studies that explore the effect of acquisition experience on acquisition performance have 
measured experience at the level of the individual (Harford and Li, 2007), the team (Nadolska 
and Barkema, 2014; McDonald et al., 2008), and the firm (Zollo and Singh, 2004). This 
implies that acquisition experience, seen as knowledge, can reside at different levels in the 
firm (Ployhart et al., 2014) but, with exception of (Crocker and Eckardt, 2014; Eckardt et al., 
2018), little attention has been paid to how the presence of knowledge at the firm-level affects 
the value firms assign to knowledge residing at the individual level.  
To realize corporate goals, individuals and teams need to perform many tasks 
supported by company guidelines and routines. In the context of acquisitions, companies that 
repeatedly engage in acquisitions tend to have a robust set of routines, coded or encoded 
procedures that directors refer to when they plan acquisitions (Zollo and Singh, 2004). In 
contrast, companies with limited acquisition experience have to explore, starting from scratch, 
and learn how to manage such major decisions and processes. If a firm has extensive 
acquisition experience owing, for example, to serial acquisitions in the past, an individual 
director's acquisition experience may add little to the already existing expertise within the firm 
(Collins et al., 2009; Hayward and Hambrick, 1997; Zollo and Singh, 2004). Thus, directors 
who plan a takeover in firms with developed routines, procedures, and guidelines can rely on 
them to make the takeover successful even though s/he has limited acquisition experience. In 
contrast, if the overall level of acquisition experience in the firm is low, a director’s acquisition 
experience becomes relatively more valuable. Consequently, the value and hence the 
remuneration attributed to directors' acquisition experience may depend on the scarcity of 
acquisition experience within the firm level. We, therefore, advance the following hypothesis: 
H4: A director’s acquisition experience is only priced in her/his remuneration contract 




3. Sample, Variables and Methodology 
3.1 Sample Selection 
Our sample includes all listed firms on the London Stock Exchange that are constituents of 
the FTSE All-Share Index, which represent more than 98 percent of the market capitalization 
of all listed UK companies in any year. We merge data from three databases: (i) Thomson-
Reuters Eikon, which contains acquisition information needed to calculate acquisition 
experience and comprehensive ownership information at the director and firm levels, (ii) 
BoardEx, which comprises the corresponding information on remuneration, governance, and 
director characteristics, and (iii) Datastream, which includes accounting and stock-price 
information (see Appendix 1 for variable definitions). Our final dataset covers 2,243 unique 
firms over a period of 17 years (1999-2016). Total remuneration for executive and non-
executive directors has increased in most years since 1999 with exception of the period 
corresponding to the financial crisis in 2008-2009. In the final dataset, we have 29,146 
director-firm-year observations, 2,288 executives (including CEOs), and 3,492 non-executive 
directors. 
 
3.2 Variable Definition and Statistics  
In Table 1, we categorize our main and control variables into eight panels. In panel A, our 
primary dependent variable is the total remuneration at the director-firm-year level. Total 
remuneration is the sum of base salary, bonus, and long-term incentive pay (Datta and 
Iskandar-Datta, 2014), each of which we also investigate in our empirical analysis. The annual 
mean (median) total compensation across all years amounts to £1,140,217 (£643,000) for 
executives (including CEOs), and £63,386 (£40,000) for non-executive directors. These 
figures tie in with earlier studies on executive and non-executive director compensation in the 
UK (Geiler and Renneboog, 2016; Renneboog and Zhao, 2011). The coefficient of variation 
(ratio of the standard deviation to the mean) for compensation of non-executives amounts to 
20.13% and illustrates significant variability for non-executive directors. Contrary to common 
belief that non-executive directors serving on the same board are paid equally, we observe in 
our data that non-executive compensation does actually differ significantly and is determined 
by experience, capability, tenure, and roles (which is also reported by Goh and Gupta, 2016). 
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Take Marks and Spencer Group Co., a leading retail company in the UK, for example. In 2014, 
its eight non-executive directors compensation ranged from £18,000 to £450,000 (see 
Appendix 2 for more details) and, even after controlling for committee memberships, the large 
pay variation remains.  
In panel B, we present the descriptive statistics of our independent variables. Director 
acquisition experience is measured as the sum of all announced acquisitions in which a 
director has been involved. It should be noted that while our sample on the relation between 
remuneration and director experience starts in 1999, we go back to 1978 to determine a 
director’s acquisition experience (as our acquisition data start in this year). This experience 
measure is calculated at the individual level and across all directorships that this individual 
has held in his current and previous firms. That is, if a director has held positions in two 
companies and each company has conducted one acquisition in the past, the director's 
acquisition experience is two. We also propose alternative measures of acquisition experience: 
(i) the number of large acquisitions (acquisitions with a transaction value above the industry 
median), (ii) the number of completed acquisitions, and (iii) a combined acquisition measure 
composed of three measures of acquisitions (number of acquisitions, of completed 
acquisitions, and of large acquisitions) obtained by means of factor analysis. We show in Panel 
B that directors experienced seven deals on average, six of which were completed and two of 
which were classified as large. 
The second key independent variable is the quality of acquisition experience. We 
partition individual acquisition experiences based on cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
around the acquisition announcement into successful, ordinary, and unsuccessful acquisition 
experiences whereby successful (unsuccessful) acquisitions have a CAR of 0.5 standard 
deviations above (below) the mean CARs in the same industry and year2 and the remaining 
acquisitions are labelled as ‘ordinary acquisitions. The CARs are calculated over a window 
of 3 days around the acquisition announcements. About 0.5 acquisitions per director are 
categorized as successful and a similar number can be classified as unsuccessful. As we will 
later find that successful and ordinary acquisition experience have comparable effects on 
remuneration, we will combine them into one category in Panel B and the regression analyses 
below. 
                                               
2 We also use alternative definitions of successful (unsuccessful) acquisition based on one and two standard 
deviations above (below) the industry average level. As shown in the results section, our results are robust across 
the three definitions. 
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To capture acquisition experience heterogeneity, we use some alternative definitions. 
First, we define deep acquisition experience, whereby deep acquisitions include: (i) domestic 
acquisitions, (ii) focused acquisitions (bidder and target operate in the same industry), (iii) 
acquisitions by an acquirer with focused operations (the bidder is active in a single industry), 
or (iv) acquisition of a focused target (operates in a single industry). We expect that directors 
are more likely to obtain specialized and industry-specific knowledge through deep 
acquisitions. In order to aggregate the above characteristics, we conduct a factor analysis. 
Broad acquisition experience is based on involvement in international (cross-border) 
takeovers or diversified ones (whereby the target is either diversified or is operational in an 
industry other than the one of the bidder). A second set of definitions hinges on how much 
time has gone by since one has accumulated acquisition experience. More recent acquisition 
experience may obviously be more valuable. We examine the recency of the acquisition 
experience by focusing on involvement in acquisitions within the last three, last four to five 
years or beyond five-years. Third, we label ‘target experience as the experience gained by 
being involved in acquisitions as a director on the board of target firms. Finally, we also 
measure acquisition experience at the firm level, which is gathered by counting the number of 
acquisitions that a firm has carried out since the beginning of the sample period. The 
acquisition experience at the firm level has a wide variation with the mean (median) number 
of acquisitions being close to nine (zero)3.  
In panels C, D, E & F of Table 1, we present a set of control variables related to director 
and board characteristics, company financials, and ownership types. In line with the extant 
literature on the determinants of director remuneration, we control for the skills level of the 
CEO (general versus specialized) and follow Custódio’s et. al., (2013) procedure. We perform 
a factor analysis on the following director-level experiences: (i) number of past executive and 
non-executive board positions held by a board member, (ii) number of firms s/he has worked 
for, (iii) number of industries that the firms s/he worked for were operating in, (iv) whether or 
not the director held a position as CEO in another firm, and (v) whether the director worked 
for a multi-division firm in the past. Other director characteristic controls include director age 
and tenure on the board (Panel C). Governance characteristics, including the number of non-
executive directors, percentage of non-executive directors, percentage of female directors and 
CEO-chairman duality (Panel D), firm financial information including ROA, market-to-book 
                                               
3 An alternative measure for firm-level acquisition experience is to take cumulative acquisition experience of all 
directors on board. Our findings remain unchanged with this alternative measure. 
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ratio, cash-flow variance, sales growth, debt ratio (% debt of total assets) and (ln)total assets 
(Panel E) and ownership structure (Panel F). Lastly, we discern acquisition experience and 
individual characteristics by board position (Panel G and H of Table 1). For instance, we 
document that chairmen and other non-executive directors tend to have more acquisition 
experience than CEOs and other executive directors. Moreover, chairmen and non-executive 
directors are older than CEOs and executive directors, which correlates with the fact that the 
former group has accumulated more experience. The definitions of all variables are 
summarized in Appendix 1 and the correlation matrix of all explanatory variables is provided 
in Table 2.  
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here] 
 
3.3 Methodology 
Our baseline regression model in which we relate (executive and non-executive) director 
compensation to acquisition experience looks as follows:  
Director_compensationi,t = β0 + β1*Acquisition_experiencei,,t-1 + β2*Director_traitsi,t-
1 + β3*Board_characteristicsi,t-1 + β4*Financial_informationi,t-1 + β5*Ownership_structurei,t-
1 + Time_fixed effectst +Director * Firm fixed effectsi + ε                         
The main dependent variable is the director’s (log) total compensation, while the main 
independent variable is the number of acquisitions a director was involved in. In addition, we 
consider a number of alternative acquisition experience measures to capture the heterogeneity 
in types of acquisition experience, e.g., the number of large and completed acquisitions and 
the number of acquisitions in recent years. The definitions of the various dependent, 
independent, and control variables are given in section 3.2 and Appendix A. We include 
director * firm fixed effects to exclude time-invariant individual director characteristics which 
may depend on the firm that employs a director in a specific role and hence may drive 
remuneration. Thus, for an individual serving on two boards (e.g. as a CEO and as a non-
executive director) we include two sets of fixed effects that capture the specific relation of the 
CEO with firm 1 and his non-executive role in firm 2. We lag our independent and control 
variables to avoid problems related to simultaneity. Standard errors are clustered at company 
and director level, as the residuals of director remuneration are likely correlated both at the 
firm level and at the individual director level across firms. 
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Although we control for a broad set of control variables as well as director*firm and 
time fixed effects, there may still be an endogeneity issue induced by omitted factors that 
affect both compensation and remuneration. In order to address such potential endogeneity 
issues, we employ a variety of approaches including a 2SLS model in which we use, as an 
instrumental variable for director experience, a director’s exposure to industrial acquisition 
active periods. Acquisition active periods are years with an abnormally high number of 
acquisitions in a given industry. During an acquisition active period (our instrument), directors 
are more likely to gain experience of acquisitions (our dependent variable), while there is no 
direct link with remuneration (our dependent variable). More details of this instrumental 
variable approach are provided below in section 4.2.1. 
First stage: 
Acquisition_experiencei,t-1 = β0 + β1* Acquisition active periodsi,t-1 + 
β2*Director_traitsi,t-1 + β3*Board_characteristicsi,t-1 + β4*Financial_informationi,t-1 + 
β5*Ownership_structurei,t-1 + Time_fixed effectst +Director * Firm fixed effectsi  + ε                         
Second stage: 
Director_compensationi,t = β0 + β1*(Fitted) acquisition_experiencei,,t-1 + 
β2*Director_characteristicsi,t-1 + β3*Board_characteristicsi,t-1 + β4*Financial_informationi,t-
1 + β5*Ownership_structurei,t-1 + Time_fixed effectst +Director * Firm fixed effectsi + ε                         
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Results 
4.1.1 Acquisition experience, director type, and remuneration 
To test the first two hypotheses, we perform a company-specific director fixed-effect 
regression of directors compensation on acquisition experience (Table 3). We include 
generalist managerial skills (Custódio et al., 2013) as well as other director traits such as tenure 
and age. Table 3 shows that, in line with Hypothesis 1, total compensation of all directors, and 
for executive and non-executive directors specifically, is positively and significantly 
associated with acquisition experience (models (1), (2) and (3), respectively). The results are 
also economically important: a one standard deviation increase in acquisition experience 
among executives and non-executives is associated with increases in total compensation of 
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4.7 and 7.8 percent, respectively equivalent to £53,266 and £4,957 a year. Model (4) shows 
that the strength of the relations between acquisition experience and compensation is higher 
for non-executive directors than for executives. This finding fails to reject Hypothesis 2 as the 
acquisition experience of non-executive directors is rewarded proportionally more than that 
of executive directors. We further examine the acquisition experience obtained by top 
managerial positions (CEO, CFO) and the chairman in Models (5)-(7). Both the CEO and the 
chairman are financially rewarded for their acquisition experience, but this is not the case for 
the CFO. We focus on the base salary in Models (8) and (9) and find that salary is significantly 
and positively associated with acquisition experience. However, there is no such significant 
relationship between bonus or equity-based pay and acquisition experience (not tabulated). 
The non-significant relation for the bonus is not unexpected as a bonus is usually awarded if 
(accounting) performance benchmarks in the recent past (usually over the past financial year) 
were reached. So, it seems that acquisition experience is priced in the total remuneration 
package and more specifically through the base salary. We conclude that the first two 
hypotheses are supported as directors expertise is factored in at the level of the fixed salary 
(and not at the level of bonuses and other incentive pay). In relative terms, acquisition 
experience is more priced for executives than for non-executive directors.   
In relation to the control variables included in table 3, we observe that general skills 
(in contrast to specialized skills such as those gained by a CFO, COO, marketing director, 
etc.) are priced more in remuneration contracts, which is in line with earlier findings in the 
literature. Tenure in the firm is financially rewarded (but not age – note that the correlation 
between age and tenure is not strong in Table 2). Director busyness and board characteristics 
do not consistently affect remuneration. Unsurprisingly, we also find positive relations 
between remuneration on the one hand and financial performance, sales growth, and firm size 
on the other.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
4.1.2 Quality and Scarcity of Acquisition Experience and Remuneration 
We turn to the effect of a director’s past track record in terms of the quality of the acquisitions, 
namely his involvement in successful acquisitions. In Table 4, we find that acquisition 
experience with successful and ordinary acquisitions is financially rewarded for all directors 
(model (1)), and this relation is driven by the subsample of non-executive directors (model 
(3)). Exposure to unsuccessful past acquisitions is not priced in the remuneration contract – 
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so experience with poor acquisitions does not seem to be considered as a learning opportunity 
as it has no impact (relative to no prior acquisition experience, the benchmark). The effect of 
successful and ordinary acquisition experience is economically important: a one standard 
deviation increase in such acquisition experience is associated with an increase in total 
compensation by 9.7 percent. Consequently, we cannot reject Hypothesis 3. We also use two 
other definitions of acquisition success/lack of success based on one or two standard 
deviations above/below the mean CAR. Models (4)-(9) yield similar results as for the base 
case models (1)-(3).  
In sum, our results are consistent with the idea that a compensation premium exists 
only for experience with non-unsuccessful acquisitions or, in other words, for not having been 
involved in poor acquisitions. This implies that when a director has experience with poor 
acquisitions, s/he seems to be held responsible and the opportunity to draw lessons for what 
has gone wrong is not priced in the remuneration contract.    
[Insert Table 4 about Here] 
In Table 5, we examine whether the part of the remuneration explained by directors
acquisition experience depends on the extent to which a firm already embeds acquisition 
experience. We document that experience is valued by the firm, but the interaction term 
(acquisition experience x firm’s acquisition experience) indicates that this is less so when the 
firm is a veteran on the acquisition market (Models (1)-(3)). In a subsequent step, we create a 
measure capturing relative experience as the number of acquisitions a director has been 
involved in minus the number of acquisitions the firm has initiated. So, this variable measures 
a director’s acquisition experience built up outside his current firm. In Model (4), we show 
that this relative experience is significantly and positively associated with director’s 
compensation: a director is paid more if his acquisition experience exceeds that of the 
company (in other words, has been obtained externally). Lastly, we conduct subsample 
analyses in Models (5) and (6) for companies with and without acquisition experience. The 
corresponding coefficients (0.017 and 0.006) indicate that a director’s acquisition experience 
is valued by both types of companies but almost three times more by firms without prior 
takeover experience. This set of results suggests that acquisition experience residing in the 
firm reduces the remuneration that directors receive as compensation for acquisition 
experience. In other words, companies reward directors expertise that is missing in a firm’s 
repertoire.   
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In sum, our results suggest that acquisition experience is rewarded, depending on the 
position that directors assume in the firm, on directors involvement in successful past 
acquisitions, and on the acquisition experience embedded in the firm. 
[Insert Table 5 about Here] 
 
4.2 Robustness Analyses 
4.2.1 Endogeneity 
Acquisition decisions may not be exogenous and may be correlated with omitted, and possibly 
latent, variables that simultaneously drive total remuneration. Using lagged independent and 
control variables, as well as the various fixed effects mitigates but may not fully address 
endogeneity concerns. Therefore, we perform additional analyses to reduce such concerns.  
A variable that could affect remuneration is a director’s reputation capital (Bugeja et 
al., 2009; Vafeas, 1999), which can be proxied by the number of outside directorships that he 
or she is offered. A director who serves on the board of another firm may benefit from that 
firm’s reputation and hence receive a higher remuneration. This would be even more so the 
case if the other firm is larger than the focal firm. Furthermore, serving on the board of a larger 
firm may also expose him to more acquisitions. Consequently, directors remuneration in a 
focal firm could be related to the reputation arising from working in a large other (non-focal) 
firm and from the acquisition experience (that s/he obtained through that firm). To rule out 
director reputation effects derived from her/his current employment at another firm, we first 
calculate the sum of the size of all non-focal firms in which a director works or has worked 
over the previous year, and then divide it by the focal firm’s size. So, we use the relative 
importance of his connections with other firms in terms of size as a proxy for reputation. In 
Table 6, we retest our hypotheses by including reputation as an additional explanatory 
variable. The coefficients of reputation are highly statistically significant, indicating that 
reputation is indeed associated with higher total remuneration for both executive and non-
executives, and hence all directors. More importantly, acquisition experience remains 
significantly and positively related to remuneration, suggesting that directors are rewarded for 
acquisition experience on top of a reputation premium (Models (1)-(3)). It should be noted 
that the effect is greater for non-executive directors (as the interaction term non-executives x 
acquisition experience in Model (4) is positive and significant). This means that we can 
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confirm our earlier findings related to Hypotheses 1 and 2. We continue by verifying, while 
controlling for director reputation, the results pertaining to the idea that experience with 
unsuccessful acquisitions is not financially rewarded and find that this is mainly the case for 
non-executive directors as reported above (Models (5)-(7)). We also confirm that while 
controlling for a director’s reputation, both types of directors receive a higher remuneration 
when they have more acquisition experience and that the impact of acquisition experience on 
remuneration of non-executive directors goes down when the firm itself has accumulated 
acquisition experience (Models (8)-(10)).4  
[Insert Table 6 about Here] 
To address other endogeneity concerns, we use industry-specific acquisition activity 
as an instrumental variable for a director’s acquisition experience in Table 7. The idea is that 
industry-specific acquisition activities, e.g., a consolidating merger wave, increases the 
number of acquisitions to which a director is exposed to, but will otherwise not affect director 
remuneration through any unobservable director characteristic. We follow Harford (2005) in 
identifying periods with intense acquisition activity and partition the sample window into two 
intervals: before the financial crisis (1999-2007) and afterwards (2008-2016). We further sub-
divide each interval into two-year periods (i.e., 1999-2000, 2000-2001, etc.) (Mitchell and 
Mulherin, 1996). For each two-year period and industry, we then count the number of 
acquisitions. The two-year period within each interval in which an industry has most 
acquisitions is labelled as an active period for that industry. In a next step, we count the number 
of active periods that an individual director has experienced in his career. We find that 44% of 
the directors never experienced any active periods, while at the other extreme, six most 
connected directors have experienced as many as seven active periods. In the first stage 
regression, we regress a director’s acquisition experience on our exogenous variable 
(‘acquisition active period’). In the second stage, we include the fitted value of director’s 
acquisitions from the first regression. We can thus retest the base models of Table 3 as well as 
all the extended models presented in the subsequent tables 4-6. 5  The results of this 
                                               
4 We also employ another measure of reputation by comparing the level of performance (the most recently 
available ROA) of the other firm(s) in which directors work. We find that all results on a director’s acquisition 
experience are upheld (not tabulated). 
5  Exception is the models testing for H3, as these specifications include two measures of experience 
(unsuccessful acquisition experience versus other experience) that are related to our exogenous variable. To 
circumvent this problem, we rely only on successful and normal acquisition experience in both stages of our 
regression framework.  
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instrumental variable analysis, presented in Table 7, broadly confirm all of previous results on 
the four hypotheses. 
[Insert Table 7 about Here] 
 
4.2.2 Future acquisitions 
The reason firms pay a higher remuneration for directors acquisition experience must be that 
they expect that this investment in expertise will be valuable in the future, which is the case if 
the firm anticipates making takeover bids. We investigate if firms executing their acquisition 
plans (ex post) did indeed pay more for acquisition experience ex ante. We introduce a new 
variable, Future acquisitions, which captures the number of acquisitions that the company will 
announce in the following financial year (Models (1)-(3)) and the subsequent two years 
(Models (4)-(6)). In Table 8, we document that acquisition experience is indeed priced in the 
remuneration contact and that this is even more so the case – especially for executive directors 
- if the firm does indeed make acquisitions in the subsequent years (as the interaction term in 
Models (2), (4) and (5) indicates). This result reinforces our claim that companies pay 
directors a premium for valuable relevant takeover experience.  
[Insert Table 8 about Here] 
 
4.2.3 Alternative Measures of Acquisition Experience 
We retest our baseline models of Table 3 by means of different measures of acquisition 
experience. Specifically, we focus on (i) experience with large acquisitions, (ii) experience 
with completed acquisitions (relative to acquisition attempts for which takeover negotiations 
failed), and (iii) an experience measure generated from a factor analysis on the total number 
of acquisitions, the number of large acquisitions, and the number of completed acquisitions 
(Models (1) to (3) of Table 9). All experience coefficients are positively statistically significant 
at the one percent level. In addition, we test two additional experience measures that capture 
the breadth (involvement in cross-industry or cross-border acquisitions) and depth 
(involvement in within-industry or domestic acquisitions) of directors acquisition experience 
and report in Models (4) and (5) results qualitatively similar to the baseline regressions. As 
our acquisition experience measure considers all acquisition transactions a director has 
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undertaken since the beginning of the acquisitions database (1978), we may have overstated 
older directors acquisition experience if the value of experience decays over time. To address 
this issue, we generate rolling windows of acquisition experience that dissect the experience 
into the one gained over the most recent three years, four to five years ago, and beyond.6 In 
Table 9 (Model (6)), we demonstrate that director compensation remains significantly 
positively related to measures of recent acquisition experience. Moreover, when we compare 
the coefficients of experience by time period, we observe that experience in recent years is 
more strongly priced in the remuneration contract, which suggests that experience is regarded 
as decaying in value. 
Lastly, we investigate directors acquisition experience from a target perspective as 
they may have been serving on the board of a target that received a takeover offer. The number 
of (announced) acquisitions a director has experienced when being on the board of the target 
company (as an executive or a non-executive director) stands for target acquisition experience. 
In Model (7) of Table 9, we find that target acquisition experience is also positively related to 
total compensation, implying that the experience of having worked in a target firm may also 
be valuable.    
[Insert Table 9 about Here] 
 
4.2.4 Additional Control Variables: Directors Committee Membership 
We included dummy variables capturing directors committee membership to rule out the 
possibility that committee membership explains the remuneration attributed to non-executive 
directors acquisition experience. We constructed (1) a dummy indicating whether a director 
served on any committee and (2) a dummy indicating whether a director served on the audit 
committee. When we included either of these variables in our models (not tabulated), all 
previous results on the impact of acquisition experience remain qualitatively similar.  
 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
                                               
6 Since we do not have sufficient data in such rolling windows for observations at the beginning of the sample 
period, these observations are removed. 
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Academic interest in the human capital of executive and non-executive directors and its 
returns for both directors and firms has recently regained momentum. Some recent papers 
show that variation in compensation is driven by differences in the value of individuals' human 
capital (Brockman et al., 2016; Bugeja et al., 2016; Datta and Iskandar-Datta, 2014).We still 
have a limited understanding of why individuals with seemingly similar human capital (based 
on past corporate positions or education) are paid differently within and across firms (Crocker 
and Eckardt, 2014; Eckardt et al., 2018). Therefore, we delve one level deeper in this study; 
we concentrate on a specific type of human capital, namely experience in takeovers, and 
examine whether acquisitions experience, which is quite heterogeneous across both executive 
and non-executive directors, is priced in their remuneration contracts.  
We find strong results on the relation between experience and compensation: (1) 
acquisition experience (measured by the number of acquisitions a director has handled) 
increases a director’s total remuneration, and this relation is relatively stronger for (2) non-
executive directors than for their executive counterparts. Given that many takeovers turn out 
to be failures, especially for bidders when agency problems and hence the tendency by the 
executive to build an empire are deemed high, takeover experience may be particularly 
important for non-executive directors in their advisory and supervisory capacity as they ought 
to give advice to pursue or refrain from takeovers. (3) Only experience with non-unsuccessful 
takeovers is priced in directors remuneration contracts; unsuccessful acquisitions are not 
rewarded and hence do not seem regarded as a learning opportunity. (4) In firms where 
acquisition experience is scarce, an individual’s expertise is valued more compared to firms 
where this experience is already abundant (as measured by the firm’s acquisition record or the 
takeover experience of the other board members).  We have verified the results by examining 
potential endogeneity concerns, by analyzing a broad set of different views on acquisition 
experience (such as industry-specific, broad or international experience, experience on a 
target’s board), and by ruling out alternative explanations (such as a director’s general skills 
level or reputation).   
Our results extend the existing work on human capital and remuneration in several 
ways. First, so far this literature has particularly focused on the transferability of human capital 
(e.g. general versus specialized CEO skills) and how this matters for remuneration (Custódio 
et al., 2013; Datta and Iskandar-Datta, 2014). By focusing on task-specific experience, we 
study one of the most important tasks that both executive and non-executive directors engage 
in, namely corporate takeovers, and examine the extent to which this type of human capital is 
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remunerated. In doing so, we generate new insights on the role of experience captured at the 
granular level of a directorship and the related remuneration contract. Using granular measures 
of experience can deepen our understanding of human capital and remuneration by directly 
measuring the tasks directors have undertaken instead of making assumptions about the type 
of tasks related to a particular position and presuming that individuals in that position have 
gained experience. 
 Second, we also contribute to the literature on boards, and more specifically on the 
difference in roles and tasks of directors. Relative to executive directors, non-executive 
directors with acquisition experience may curb wealth-reducing acquisitions as fiduciaries to 
shareholders. Moreover, in their advisory and supervisory capacity, a key strategic task of non-
executive directors is the identification of potential takeover targets and providing advice to 
pursue and – maybe even more important in the wake of the overwhelming evidence of poorly 
performing acquisitions - refrain from a takeover to the executive directors. In line with this 
argument, our results suggest that firms not only consider director experience but also their 
potential commitment to fully deploy their expertise in the interest of the firm when 
determining a pay premium for a director’s acquisition expertise (Hambrick et al., 2015). The 
implication of this finding is that a pay premium on human capital is conditional on not only 
the expertise that individuals hold but also on firms expectation of whether the individual 
would leverage her expertise in the interest of the firm.    
 Third, our paper shows that firms clearly discern what they regard as relevant quality 
of experience (failures versus successes in undertaking acquisitions) and seem to project the 
capability of a director to handle future acquisitions. Several papers also document the impact 
of failed versus successful acquisitions in different contexts. For instance, successful past 
acquisitions yield a higher number of board seats to executives (Harford and Schonlau, 2013), 
although Mira et al. (2018) dispute this as they do not find an effect.     
Fourth, theoretical advances in human-capital research underscore the need to explore the 
interplay between human capital at the individual and firm levels (Ployhart et al., 2014; Wright 
et al., 2014). This paper reveals that such an interplay exists between acquisition experience 
residing within the firm and at the individual director level. In this regard, our results suggest 
a substitution effect of knowledge at the firm and individual level: firms reduce the potential 
value (and consequently the pay level) they attach to individual expertise when that expertise 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
This table presents descriptive statistics of the main variables. Panel A reports statistics of dependent variables: director’s total 
compensation, consisting of salary, bonus, equity-based compensation and other compensation. Panel B reports statistics of 
various acquisition experience measures. Control variables including director characteristics, board characteristics, financial 
information and ownership structure are summarized in Panel C to F. In Panel G and H, we show acquisition experience statistics 
and director characteristics across director positions. Detailed variable definitions are given in Appendix 1. 
  N Mean SD 10th Perc. Median 90th Perc. 
A Total compensation (‘000)       
 Total compensation—all  28524 439.167 1440.888 22 65 1113 
 Total compensation—executives 9954 1140.217 2275.246 206 643 2317 
 Total compensation—non-executives 18570 63.386 98.390 19 40 123 
B Director acquisition experience       
 Acquisition experience (number) 29146 7.383 10.902 0 3 20 
 Acquisition experience (large) 29146 1.578 3.100 0 0 5 
 Acquisition experience (complete) 29146 6.070 9.005 0 3 17 
 Acquisition experience (factor) 29146 0.418 1.137 -0.434 -0.069 1.946 
 Successful and ordinary acquisition experience 
(definition 2) 
29146 6.944 10.467 0 3 19 
 Unsuccessful acquisition experience 29146 0.440 0.937 0 0 2 
 Deep acquisition experience 29146 0.395 1.089 -0.391 -0.046 1.866 
 Broad acquisition experience  29146 0.314 1.032 -0.362 -0.120 1.666 
 Acquisition experience (recent 3 years) 29022 3.189 4.765 0 1 9 
 Acquisition experience (recent 4-5 years) 29022 1.711 3.381 0 0 5 
 Acquisition experience (beyond 5 years) 29081 2.500 5.955 0 0 8 
 Acquisition experience (target) 29146 0.151 0.441 0 0 1 
 Company acquisition experience 29146 8.710 17.849 0 0 31 
C Director characteristics       
 General skills 29146 0.087 0.988 -0.731 -0.208 1.451 
 Tenure (years) 29146 6.7 5.72 1.4 5.1 14.1 
 Age (years) 29146 56.5 8.3 45 57 67 
D Board characteristics       
 Director busyness 29146 0.111 0.315 0 0 1 
 Non-executive directors (%) 29146 62.9 18.6 41.7 60.0 100.0 
 Female directors (%) 29146 7.8 10.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 
 Chairman-CEO Duality 29146 0.058 0.233 0 0 0 
E Financial information        
 ROA (%) 29146 4.813 10.406 -3.200 5.700 15.650 
 Market-to-book ratio 29146 2.306 2.037 0.630 1.630 5.050 
 Cash-flow variance 27007 46.036 2411.394 0.000 0.005 0.173 
 Sales growth 29146 0.100 0.253 -0.168 0.064 0.413 
 Debt ratio (%) 29146 19.350 16.860 0 16.540 43.620 
 (ln) total assets 29146 20.287 1.993 18.151 20.036 22.732 
F Ownership structure       
 Ownership held by family (%) 27007 5.9 13.4 0.0 0.0 16.0 
 Ownership held by government (%) 27007 0.8 3.3 0.0 0.0 2.3 
 Ownership held by institution (%) 27007 45.4 30.6 4.5 43.7 92.0 
 Ownership held by corporate (%) 27007 8.5 14.3 0.0 3.7 20.8 
 Ownership held by other (%) 27007 1.1 4.4 0.0 0.0 2.9 
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 Acquisition experience (number) 6.865 5.016 10.645 7.384 
 Acquisition experience (large) 1.282 0.881 2.275 1.683 
 Acquisition experience (complete) 5.742 4.215 8.845 6.010 
 Acquisition experience (factor) 0.374 0.162 0.760 0.420 
 Successful and ordinary acquisition 
experience  
6.417 4.678 10.068 6.942 
 Unsuccessful acquisition experience 0.448 0.338 0.577 0.442 
 Deep acquisition experience 0.488 0.275 0.605 0.361 
 Broad acquisition experience  0.184 0.033 0.658 0.339 
 Acquisition experience (recent 3 years) 3.013 2.422 4.066 3.410 
 Acquisition experience (recent 4-5 years) 1.617 1.220 2.463 1.710 
 Acquisition experience (beyond 5 years) 2.323 1.656 4.244 2.373 
 Acquisition experience (target) 0.119 0.087 0.210 0.159 
 






 General skills -0.138 -0.389 0.529 0.201 
 Tenure (years) 8.823 6.870 8.908 5.434 
 Age (years) 51.869 49.674 61.389 58.616 
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Table 2. Correlation matrix 




  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1 (Log) total compensation 1.00 
 
2 Acquisition experience (number) 0.08 1.00 
                  
3 General skill -0.18 0.34 1.00 
                 
4 Tenure 0.14 0.11 -0.12 1.00 
                
5 Age -0.37 0.19 0.11 0.25 1.00 
               
6 Busy director -0.19 0.16 0.58 -0.06 0.11 1.00 
              
7 Non-executive (%) -0.28 -0.02 0.07 -0.07 0.18 0.09 1.00 
             
8 Female (%) 0.02 0.04 0.02 -0.07 -0.03 0.00 0.15 1.00 
            
9 Duality 0.01 -0.07 -0.06 0.06 0.00 -0.03 -0.18 -0.02 1.00 
           
10 ROA (%) 0.08 0.07 -0.01 0.06 0.01 -0.02 -0.06 0.00 0.01 1.00 
          
11 Market-to-book ratio 0.12 0.06 0.00 -0.05 -0.06 -0.03 -0.18 0.03 0.02 0.21 1.00 
         
12 Cash-flow variance 0.15 0.07 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.15 0.01 0.07 0.10 0.09 1.00 
        
13 Sales growth 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.08 0.02 0.01 1.00 
       
14 Ownership: family 0.02 -0.06 -0.04 0.06 -0.02 -0.03 -0.16 -0.03 0.13 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.00 1.00 
      
15 Ownership: government 0.03 0.06 0.01 -0.05 0.02 0.00 0.11 0.08 -0.03 -0.04 -0.07 0.03 -0.06 -0.04 1.00 
     
16 Ownership: institution 0.09 0.08 0.05 -0.05 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.09 -0.07 0.04 0.01 0.00 -0.04 0.04 0.06 1.00 
    
17 Ownership: corporate 0.05 0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.03 -0.01 -0.06 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.05 -0.01 0.08 1.00 
   
18 Ownership: other 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.04 1.00 
  
19 Debt ratio (%) 0.10 0.11 0.03 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 -0.07 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.04 -0.09 -0.02 0.04 -0.05 0.04 -0.05 1.00 
 
20 (Log) total assets 0.23 0.30 0.03 -0.11 0.08 -0.03 0.16 0.20 -0.09 0.09 -0.02 0.27 -0.07 -0.13 0.23 -0.01 -0.06 0.01 0.32 1.00 
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Table 3. Acquisition experience and compensation 
This table presents the regressions explaining directors’ (natural logarithm) total compensation (models (1)-(7)) and (ln) base 
salary (models (8) and (9)) by acquisition experience and a set of control variables. Models (1) and (4) are based on full sample of 
all directors. Models (2) and (3) are run on subsamples of executive directors and non-executive directors, respectively. 
Subsamples of top management positions (CEO, CFO and chairman) are depicted in Models (5)-(7). Regressions of base salary 
are reported in Models (8) and (9). Acquisition experience is measured by the total number of acquisitions a director has 
experienced in his career (as executive and nonexecutive director). We control for director traits, board characteristics, financial 
information and ownership structure. Time, and directors * firm fixed effects are included. Variable definitions are given in 
Appendix 1. Standard errors are clustered at the firm and director level and reported in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level is indicated by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively. 
 





  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
Sample group All Execs 
Non-
execs  
All CEO CFO Chair All All 
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 Director * firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 R2 0.174 0.156 0.256 0.246 0.179 0.247 0.101 0.246 0.314 
 N 28522 9953 18569 28522 3332 692 4753 28479 28479 
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Table 4. The quality of acquisition experience 
This table presents the regressions explaining directors’ (ln) total compensation by quality of acquisition experience. The full sample is used in model (1). Models (2) and (3) 
are run on subsamples of executive and nonexecutive directors respectively. Each model in model (1) - (3) includes two measures of acquisition quality: successful and 
ordinary acquisitions experience, and unsuccessful acquisitions experience (no acquisition experience is the left out benchmark). Definition 1 for acquisition quality is as 
follows: successful acquisitions have a CAR[0,1] higher than the average market reaction plus 0.5 standard deviation; unsuccessful ones have a CAR[0,1] lower than the 
average market reaction minus 0.5 standard deviation; and the other acquisitions are labelled ‘ordinary’ acquisitions. Estimates based on definitions 2 (1 standard deviation 
from the average market reaction) and 3 (2 standard deviations from the average market reaction) are reported in models (4)-(6) and models (7)-(9) respectively. We control 
for director characteristics, board characteristics, financial information and ownership structure, as in Table 3. Time and director * firm fixed effects are included. Detailed 
variable definitions are given in Appendix 1. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-director level and reported in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is 
indicated by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively. 
 
  Acquisition Quality: Definition 1 Acquisition Quality: Definition 2 Acquisition Quality: Definition 3 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Sample group  All Execs Non-execs All Execs Non-execs All Execs Non-execs 







































Director traits  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Board characteristics  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Financial information   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 




















Director * firm FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2  0.173 0.156 0.255 0.173 0.156 0.255 0.173 0.156 0.255 
N  28522 9953 18569 28522 9953 18569 28522 9953 18569 
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Table 5. The substitution effect of firm’s collective acquisition experience 
This table presents the regressions explaining directors’ (ln) total compensation by acquisition experience measures and a set of control variables. A firm’s acquisition 
experience is measured by the number of acquisitions it has made. The full sample is used in model (1). Models (2) and (3) are based on subsamples of executive and 
nonexecutive directors respectively. Relative acquisition experience, measured by director’s acquisition experience minus firm’s acquisition experience, replaces acquisition 
experience in model (4). Models (5) and (6) are based on subsamples of directors hired by firms without acquisition experience and directors hired by in firms with 
acquisition experience, respectively. We control for director traits, board characteristics, financial information and ownership structure. Time, and director * firm fixed effects 
are included. Variable definitions are given in Appendix 1. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-director level and reported in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level is indicated by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively. 
 
Dep. Var.: (ln) total compensation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sample group All Execs Non-execs All 





























































Director traits Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Board characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Financial information Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 














Director * firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.175 0.159 0.257 0.166 0.146 0.246 
N 28522 9953 18569 27054 18319 10203 
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Table 6. Analysis of reputational effects 
This table the regression results explaining directors’ (ln) total compensation by acquisition experience measures and a set of control variables. To proxy for a director’s 
reputation, we use his directorships at firms other than the focal firm: we first calculate the sum of the size of all non-focal firms in which a director works or has worked over 
the previous year, and then divide it by the focal firm’s size, which yields the relative importance of his connections with other firms in terms of size. The table retest the 
models presented in Tables 1-3 while controlling for director reputation. We control for director traits, board characteristics, financial information and ownership structure. 
Time, and director * firm fixed effects are included. Variable definitions are given in Appendix 1. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-director level and reported in 
parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively. 
 
Dep. Variable: (ln) total compensation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Sample group: All Execs Non-execs All All Execs Non-execs All Execs Non-execs 











































   -1.528*** 
(0.102) 
      
Non-executives × 
Acquisition experience (H2) 
   0.007** 
(0.003) 
      
Successful and ordinary acquisition 
experience (H3) 






   
Unsuccessful acquisition experience 






   
Firms’ acquisition experience 






Directors’ acquisition experience × 
firms’ acquisition experience (H4) 






Director traits Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Board characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Financial information Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 






















Director * firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.182 0.157 0.284 0.258 0.181 0.156 0.284 0.182 0.159 0.285 
N 28080 9839 18241 28080 28080 9839 18241 28080 9839 18241 
  




Table 7. Exposure to acquisition active periods (Instrumental Variable approach)  
We use 2SLS regression to address endogeneity issues. In the first stage, we regress acquisition experience on the instrumental variable ‘Acquisition active period’. The fitted 
value of acquisition experience is included in the second stage. The following table presents the 2nd stage regressions explaining directors’ (ln) total compensation by fitted 
acquisition experience measures and a set of control variables. The structure of the table is similar to Table 6. We control for director traits, board characteristics, financial 
information and ownership structure. Time and director * firm fixed effects are included. Variable definitions are given in Appendix 1. Standard errors are clustered at the 
firm-director level and reported in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively. 
 
Second stage regression 
Dep. Variable: (ln) total compensation 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Sample group: All Execs Non-execs All All Execs Non-execs All Execs Non-execs 






























      
Non-executives × 









      
Successful and ordinary acquisition 
experience 






   
Firms’ acquisition experience 






Directors’ acquisition experience × 
firms’ acquisition experience (H4) 






Director traits Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Board characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Financial information Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 






















Director * firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 







Table 8. Future acquisitions 
This table presents regressions explaining directors’ (ln) total compensation by acquisition experience measures and a set of 
control variables. In models (1)-(3), Future acquisitions refer to the number of acquisitions a company will announce over the 
next financial year. In models (4)-(6), Future acquisitions refer to the number of acquisitions a company will announce over the 
next two years. We control for director traits, board characteristics, financial information and ownership structure. Time, and 
director * firm fixed effects are included. Detailed variable definitions are given in Appendix 1. Standard errors are clustered at 
the firm level and reported in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, 
respectively 
Dep. Variable: (ln) total compensation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sample group: All Execs Non-execs All Execs Non-execs 




















   
Acquisition experience × 







   
Future acquisitions (over next two years) 






Acquisition experience × 
Future acquisitions (over next two years) 






Director traits Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Board characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Financial information Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 














Director * firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.175 0.159 0.256 0.172 0.159 0.250 






Table 9. Alternative measures of acquisition experience 
This table presents regressions explaining directors’ (ln) total compensation by acquisition experience measures and a set of 
control variables. In each model, we focus on one specific acquisition experience measure, which are defined in Section 3.2 
and Appendix 1. We control for director traits, board characteristics, financial information and ownership structure. Time and 
director * firm fixed effects are included. All variable definitions are given in Appendix 1. Standard errors are clustered at the 
firm-director level and reported in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level is indicated by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, 
respectively. 
Dep. Variable: (ln) total compensation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Sample group All All All All All All All 







    


















































































Acquisition experience (beyond 5 years) 
     0.007*** 
(0.002) 
 













Director traits Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Board characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Financial information Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
















Director * firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.173 0.175 0.176 0.175 0.176 0.173 0.172 









(Ln) total compensation Logarithm of a director’s total compensation in GBP. 
Acquisition experience (number)  The number of (announced) acquisitions a director was involved in. 
Acquisition experience (complete) The number of completed acquisitions a director was involved in.  
Acquisition experience (large) 
The number of large acquisitions (above the median size) a director was 
involved in. 
Acquisition experience (factor) A director’s overall acquisition experience calculated using a factor analysis. 
Deep acquisition experience 
A director’s experience in domestic acquisitions or acquisitions within the 
industry. 
Broad acquisition experience A director’s experience in foreign acquisitions or acquisitions across industries. 
Acquisition experience (target) 
The number of (announced) acquisitions a director was involved in as a member 
of target firms. 
Acquisition experience (recent 3 years) The number of acquisitions a director was involved in in the recent 3 years. 
Acquisition experience (recent 4-5 years) The number of acquisitions a director was involved in in the recent 4-5 years. 
Acquisition experience (beyond 5 years) The number of acquisitions a director was involved in beyond 5 years. 
Unsuccessful acquisition experience  
The number of acquisitions with a cumulative abnormal return (within 3-days 
around the announcement date) of at least 0.5 (Definition 1), 1 (Definition 2), or 
2 (Definition 3) standard deviations below the mean. (This is counted at the 
director level). 
Successful and ordinary acquisition 
experience 
The number of acquisitions that are not classified as unsuccessful experiences. 
Firm’s acquisition experience The number of acquisitions a company has made since 1978. 
Relative acquisition experience A director’s acquisition experience minus firm’s acquisition experience. 
Reputation 
The ratio of the sum of firm sizes of all firms a director has previously served to 
the firm size of the focal firm. 
Acquisition active periods   
The number of acquisition active periods a director has experienced. An active 
period is years during which acquisition activity is abnormally high in an 
industry. 
General skills 
A measure based on a factor analysis of the past number of positions, firms, and 
industries in which a CEO worked, and two binary variables measuring whether 
the director held a position as CEO at a different company and whether the CEO 
worked for a conglomerate firm (see Custódio et al., 2013) 
Tenure A director’s tenure on the current board in years.  
Age A director’s age in years.  
Busy director A binary variable that equals 1 if the director is on more than two boards.  
Non-executive A binary variable that equals 1 if the director is a non-executive director. 
Non-executive (%) The percentage of non-executive directors on the board. 
Female (%) The percentage of female directors on the board. 
Duality A binary variable that equals 1 if the CEO is also the chairman. 
ROA Operating income divided by total assets. 
Market-to-book ratio Market value divided by the book value of equity. 
Cash-flow variance Logarithm of the variance in cash flows. 
Sales growth The change in sales relative to previous financial year. 
Ownership: family The percentage of shares owned by a family. 
Ownership: government The percentage of shares owned by the government. 
Ownership: institution The percentage of shares owned by financial institutions. 
Ownership: corporate The percentage of shares owned by other corporations. 
Ownership: other The percentage of shares owned by other types of shareholders. 
Debt ratio Total debt divided by total assets. 
(Ln) total assets Logarithm of total assets. 
 
  
